Four years of war in Iraq
Four full years have passed since U.S. and British forces invaded Iraq in the face of widespread opposition voiced around the world. Look at the outcome of the war now. Nobody could possibly say Iraq or the world is safer today than in 2003. It is hard not to be stunned by the enormity of the losses caused by this misstep.
Before the onset of war, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made the case for military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein in his speech to the U.N. Security Council. Later, Powell bitterly recalled the moment, saying it was a "blot" on his record. The comment apparently reflects his deep regret about how he tried to persuade the international community to support a war based on unfounded intelligence.
It is widely known that the security policy of the Bush administration was shaped mostly by his neoconservative advisers. Francis Fukuyama, once one of the opinion leaders in the neocon camp, later declared his ideological conversion. Fukuyama argued that linking the Sept. 11 terror attacks against the United States to Iraq was nothing more than fraudulent.
Back then, there was certainly a sense of urgency in the world about the prospect of Saddam's regime acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Many people believed that military action had to be tolerated to prevent a bloodbath. Four years on, Iraq is in a state of civil war. The sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims gets bloodier by the day and some 3.9 million Iraqis have fled their towns and country for safety.
Not all diplomatic options were exhausted before the conflict started. The plan for the postwar occupation of Iraq was based on overly optimistic assumptions. Above all, the United States failed to engineer a united international front for the war that included Islamic nations. It is important to ponder the bitter lessons of the war without belittling them with the luxury of hindsight.
The biggest failure of the U.S. and British governments was the discovery that weapons of mass destruction, cited as the central cause for the war, did not exist. The two governments manipulated intelligence to make the world believe a security crisis was unfolding. The manipulation of intelligence was exposed by investigations conducted by the U.S. Congress and other organizations to uncover the reasons for the policy debacle.
Media organizations, which drummed up support for the war, were left with egg on their faces. Leading American and British media reviewed their coverage of events leading up to the war and embarked on efforts to avoid making the same mistakes again.
In Japan, meantime, the administration of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and that of his successor, Shinzo Abe, have continued to justify their respective decisions to support the U.S.-led war against Iraq. Neither has discussed the wrong decision to start war in the first place.
Only one member of the current Cabinet, Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma, has talked candidly about his negative views of the war. But he has been criticized for not toeing the government line. It seems the Cabinet has a policy of not admitting any error in government judgment. We are equally surprised by Japanese media organizations that supported the war have shown no signs of remorse.
The alliance with the United States is vital for Japan's defense. But that doesn't mean the government should stop thinking independently and just go along with any U.S. policy. It could happen that the interests of two close allies don't coincide. As a nation that started its postwar history with serious soul-searching over a devastating war, Japan should have made greater efforts to help prevent the war against Iraq. That's how we feel now.
In order to pursue its own foreign policy agenda while cherishing the alliance with the United States, Japan needs a lot of diplomatic prowess in promoting international cooperation, especially through the United Nations and other multilateral frameworks.
A mistake offers many lessons. The first thing to do is to face up to the mistake.
