Blair's 'special relationship'

Unconditionally supporting Bush's wars isn't the stuff that built the storied transatlantic alliance.

By Ian Kershaw

IN THE CURRENT discussion of Tony Blair's legacy, a central issue has inevitably been his decision to support President Bush and to take Britain into the disastrous war with Iraq. Even now, precisely what led this talented and politically shrewd prime minister to make such a catastrophic decision is not fully clear. The actual decision-making process remains largely opaque. What is certain, however, is that the perceived "special relationship" between Britain and the United States played a great part in the decision.

Blair is a conviction politician par excellence. His actions have been nobly motivated, underpinned by his Christian beliefs and guided by the principles of liberal interventionism to bring about democracy and justice.

In Kosovo in 1999, these principles prompted intervention, which was instrumental in preventing further ethnic cleansing and ultimately bringing about the removal and trial of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. After 9/11 they led Blair to offer his immediate, unconditional support for the United States. The war in Afghanistan followed, but so did the ill-fated commitment to the war in Iraq.

Yet Blair's decision was out of line with the history of the "special relationship" — a relationship that has generally benefited from a less emotional, more hardheaded and cautious approach, with specific attention paid to the respective national interests of both countries.

In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for instance, British support was given not directly to the U.S. but to a multinational effort, crucially backed by Arab countries, to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait — a limited objective, following a clear breach of international law by Iraq. In 1982, there was American diplomatic backing for Britain in Margaret Thatcher's Falklands War, but militarily this was a purely British affair.

In the late 1960s, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, despite otherwise good relations with President Johnson, was careful to keep Britain out of the Vietnam quagmire. In 1956, President Eisenhower would have no truck with the mendacious and disastrous decision by Anthony Eden to invade the Suez Canal Zone and was instrumental in forcing the ignominious British withdrawal.

Above all, in World War II, when the political "special relationship" was first formed, the crucial decisions were taken judiciously, cautiously and with the respective national interests considered paramount. If Blair's decision to go to war was the worst by a British prime minister in recent times, Winston Churchill's in 1940 was the best.

In May 1940, with the British army stranded at Dunkirk and presumed lost, with a German invasion of Britain thought to be imminent, Churchill, new as prime minister, his authority still weak, deliberated with the War Cabinet for three days whether to seek a negotiated end to the war (as suggested by Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary) or to fight on.

Only after a prolonged, rational debate was it decided to fight on. It was among the most vital decisions of World War II. Yet it was based mainly on hope — that Britain could hold out and that American help would eventually be forthcoming. Churchill was at the time privately critical of the United States for offering "practically no help in the war" and wanting "to keep everything which would help us for their own defense." The "special relationship" was, in truth, not so special at this time.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt had little choice but to look to American interests. He had to tread warily with isolationist opinion, both among the American public and even more so in Congress. Besides, there was little or nothing to offer in the spring of 1940, when the danger to Britain was most acute. The powerful military-industrial complex did not exist. At the time, the U.S. Army was tiny, ranked 20th in the world, one place behind Holland's. .

Nevertheless, Churchill continued to hope. He knew that the U.S. was rearming fast and that American military and economic support would be vital if Britain were to hold out and ultimately prevail in the fight against Hitler.

Soon, U.S. aid, in the first instance through the Lend-Lease program, was indeed forthcoming. American self-interest, not pure idealism, properly lay behind it. The U.S. government saw plainly that if Britain were defeated — and if Germany were to conquer the whole of Europe — there would eventually be a direct threat to the United States. Not only were trading interests at risk, but a military threat was considered likely.

During the next months, Roosevelt edged cautiously, despite Churchill's wishes and urging, toward American intervention in the war, resisting pressure from within his Cabinet.

Eventually, of course, Japanese and German action took the uncomfortable decision away from the president. Just how crucial the carefully reached decisions of 1940-41 were to the history of Britain and the United States is obvious.

Reactions in international crises determine the historical reputations of leaders. That is why Roosevelt and Churchill are remembered as two giants of the 20th century. In contrast, the reputations of Bush and Blair can only suffer from the decision to invade Iraq.

More than that, the ideological interventionist drive by the neoconservatives, backed by Blair's impetuous and ill-conceived support, have contributed to undermining the international standing and power positions of both parties to the "special relationship."