There's Danger in Bilateral N. Korea-U.S. Talks

Last November, U.S. President George W. Bush suddenly said he was willing to consider declaring the end of the Korean War if Pyongyang dismantles its nuclear program. Since then, the American strategy toward North Korea has been changing quietly but surely. The U.S. seems to have decided to conduct direct talks with North Korea on building a peace framework, the key security issue on the peninsula, if only the North Korean nuclear weapons are dismantled. Not so long ago, Washington was saying any peace treaty with North Korea -- the issue the Roh Moo-hyun administration had urged it to settle ? can only come after North Korea’s nuclear program is entirely gone.

Both the talks on the North’s frozen bank accounts in Macau, which began in Beijing, and the next round of the six-party talks slated for Feb. 8 are the outcome of direct negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. Washington had no choice but to engage in direct talks with the North to stop Pyongyang from going any further with its nuclear program at a time when, backed by cooperation from South Korea and China, North Korea was challenging international sanctions imposed after its nuclear test. Besides, the U.S. is bogged down in Iraq. Bush has decided to send some 20,000 reinforcement troops to "wrap up" the Iraq war but is meeting heavy resistance by the Democrats and the press. On Jan. 27, tens of thousands of people held an anti-war rally in Washington. As a result, the U.S. is short of psychological and military reserves to concentrate on the North Korean nuclear issue, even though it is well aware of its importance.

The U.S. is putting bait on a hook called peace treaty in addition to an offer to partly unfreeze the Macau accounts. Kathleen Stephens, the principal deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited Seoul in strict secrecy last week for talks with national security and foreign affairs officials on concluding a peace agreement with North Korea. This shows how fast everything is proceeding.

The peace treaty is a Pandora’s box for security on the Korean Peninsula. Despite the name, a "peace framework" will not necessarily bring peace on the peninsula; instead, it could add momentum to North Korean propaganda aimed at South Korea and might deal a fatal blow to South Korea's national security. This is why previous South Korean administrations were reluctant to open the box. In addition, there are unknown variables in South Korea’s takeover of sole operational control of Korean forces, and the consequent end of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command -- both issues that the Roh administration has far pushed for -- and a changed role and status for UN Command, which is now in charge of maintaining the armistice.

The problem lies with the government’s willingness to discuss our fate with the North Korean regime, its willingness to trust it in the name of peace and the nation. A few days ago, Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung visited the joint-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea. He waxed poetic on the occasion, saying, "North and South are joining hands in making a product called peace." Some time ago, he was criticized for his slanted view of history. No wonder people worry about unrealistic views of North Korea by the Roh administration.

Experts at home and abroad agree that we must not change the existing security framework based on the Korea-U.S. alliance before North Korea dismantles its nuclear program. South Korea might face a real crisis when the U.S., as it did during the Vietnam War, engages in direct talks with the North based on a “realistic" approach, and when the Roh administration starts peace talks with the North under a cooperation policy.

The only variable is that North Korea, too, is currently in unprecedented trouble. Since the financial sanctions were imposed in the aftermath of its nuclear test, North Korea has been short of hard currency. As a result, Kim Jong-il has been unable to keep up his handouts to loyal associates, while a food shortage is reportedly destabilizing things at the grassroots level. At this juncture, if it is given a chance for the peace talks Kim Jong-il is demanding, North Korea might see them as a good opportunity to turn over a new leaf in its strategy toward South Korea.

Roh has only 10 months before he leaves office. There is no point trying to influence the presidential election and pushing for a change of presidential terms in office in a peaceful atmosphere created by the six-party talks, or by trying to fuel hopes for any inter-Korean summit, a peace treaty, or an inter-Korean agreement on unification. If the Roh administration is incapable of governing reasonably, the main opposition party should take the initiative to work out a crisis management plan. Whether the main opposition party has the willpower and capability to do that, however, is doubtful.

The column was contributed by Hong Kwan-hee, director of the Institute for Security and Strategy.